Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance: Evidence from Swiss Cantons by Lars P. Feld et al.
PHILIPPS-UNIVERSITÄT MARBURG
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Lars P. Feld / Gebhard Kirchgässner
Christoph A. Schaltegger
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance:




Prof. Dr. Lars Feld
Philipps-Universität Marburg X Philipps University at Marburg
FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften X Dept. Of Business Administration and Economics
Abteilung Finanzwissenschaft X Public Finance
Am Plan 2 • D-35037 Marburg
Tel. ++49-6421-2821702 • Fax ++49-6421-2824852
E-Mail: feld@wiwi.uni-marburg.de– 1 –
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance:
Evidence from Swiss Cantons
by
Lars P. Feld
Phillips-University of Marburg, University of St. Gallen and CESifo
Gebhard Kirchgässner
University of St. Gallen, SIAW-HSG, and CESifo
Christoph A. Schaltegger
Swiss Federal Tax Administration, FTA and University of St. Gallen, SIAW-HSG
The advantages and disadvantages of fiscal federalism are widely discussed in economics and
political science. While some authors argue that federalism favors individual initiatives and
serves as a market preserving device, others emphasize the dangers arising from an increasing
corruption and local capture due to decentralization. In this paper, we empirically study the
impact of different instruments of fiscal federalism on economic performance measured by
GDP per capita using panel data for the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998. In our
econometric production function approach, the impact of fiscal federalism, tax competition
and grants on economic performance is analyzed by additionally using controls for physical
and human capital investment as well as further controls and indicators of fiscal federalism.
According to our results, the intensity of tax competition, which is measured by the difference
between a cantons tax rate and the average of its neighbors’ tax rates, is at least not harmful
for economic performance. Moreover, the fragmentation of cantons in communities does not
affect real GDP per capita indicating that economies of scale do not necessarily provide a
good argument for a merger of communities.
JEL-Classification: D7, D72, H71
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Economic Performance, Tax Competition, Grants.
The authors would like to acknowledge a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation
(Grant-No. 5004-58524), Lars P. Feld additionally acknowledges a grant from the German
Science Foundation.
Mailing Address: Prof. Dr. Lars P. Feld Prof. Dr. Gebhard Kirchgässner
Philipps-University Marburg  University of St. Gallen
Public Finance Group SIAW-HSG
Am Plan 2 Bodanstr. 8
D-35037 Marburg (Lahn) CH-9000 St. Gallen
Germany  Switzerland
feld@wiwi.uni-marburg.de Gebhard.Kirchgaessner@unisg.ch– 2 –
The planned economy in a federal country
cannot assume the forms which today are
– only too well – known under this name;
... in a federal country economic policy
has to be directed towards creating a na-
tional durable system of rules, within
which the personal initiative has the wid-
est possible scope and can be brought into
effect as favorably as possible.
Friedrich A. von Hayek (1939, p. 340)
1. Introduction
The advantages and disadvantages of fiscal federalism or decentralization are widely dis-
cussed in economics and political science. While some authors argue that federalism or de-
centralization of state activity favor individual initiatives and serve as a market preserving
device (Weingast 1995), others emphasize the dangers arising from increased corruption and
local capture (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997, Brueckner 2000, Bardhan 2002). The politi-
cal controversy is mainly focused on the proper organization of government in developing
countries. However, a similar discussion on fiscal federalism or decentralization has focused
on OECD countries. For example, in the current discussion of reforming German federalism,
it is widely recognized that the inability to re-design the German welfare state is partly the
result of the “joint decision trap” (Scharpf 1978, 1988) emerging from a cooperative federal-
ism German style. In that discussion, the proponents of fiscal decentralization emphasize the
beneficial impact that fiscal competition between sub-federal jurisdictions may have on the
efficiency of public goods’ provision while opponents point to the undesired impact of fiscal
competition on personal and regional income redistribution. The German commission on the
reform of federalism has decided to leave a competitive federalism out of discussion. The
argument is that several poorer states in particular in Eastern Germany have insufficient re-
sources to enter a ‘fair’ fiscal competition. The commission is supposed to propose a more
clear-cut constitutional assignment of federal and state responsibilities, only. Excluding the
power to tax from the reform of German federalism is subsequently criticized by proponents
of fiscal competition as deliberately leaving potential efficiency gains unconsidered.
The assessment of competitive and cooperative forms of fiscal federalism is also ambiguous
from a theoretical point of view as recent surveys on the tax competition literature show (Wil-
son 1999, Wilson and Wildasin 2004). Equally valid theoretical arguments do not offer clear-
cut economic policy advice. On the one hand, some economists emphasize advantages of fis-
cal federalism like high variability and quality of goods and services and the enforcement of– 3 –
individual preferences in the provision of public goods. Tiebout’s metaphor (1956) of „voting
by feet“ hence implies that fiscal competition leads to an efficient supply of public services.
On the other hand, this interpretation has extensively been criticized in the literature on tax
competition by other economists like e.g. by Gordon (1983) and Sinn (1997, 2003) supporting
the critiques of fiscal competition for allocative and redistributive reasons. Finally, from a
political economy perspective (Brennan and Buchanan 1980), fiscal competition is interpreted
as a possibility to reduce the size of government and thus to maintain the efficiency of a mar-
ket system. Because of enhanced migration possibilities of mobile investors, governments of
sub-federal jurisdictions are forced to tailor their fiscal policies to the needs of investors and
to find policy solutions favoring market economies.
Another aspect of fiscal competition has recently gained attention. In a system of competitive
federalism, sub-federal jurisdictions can experiment with new economic policies. Efficient
solutions will be imitated while unsuccessful policies are refused by the competing jurisdic-
tions. Thus, competition between jurisdictions results in a discovery process, eventually con-
tributing to progress in the public sector. Federalism and decentralization lead to a higher in-
novative capacity of the political system. This argument often appears in the political discus-
sion in Germany where the lack of competition between states is supposed to prevent a reform
of the German welfare state. Oates (1999) speaks of ‘laboratory federalism’ and points out
that the reform of welfare in the US in 1996 followed these considerations (see Inman and
Rubinfeld 1997). However, the innovation inducing capacity of competitive as compared to
cooperative federalism is disputed, too. In a decentralized system, citizens use the quality and
the prices of public services in other jurisdictions as a yardstick in elections of representatives
in their own jurisdiction (‘yardstick competition’ according to Salmon 1987, Besley and Case
1995). If the government of a state faces uncertainty of re-election, it has an incentive to act as
a free-rider with respect to the policy innovations of other jurisdictions reducing the absolute
amount of policy innovations in a federal country (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002).
The implicit hypotheses from this discussion need to be tested empirically in order to provide
some confidence in specific policy proposals. However, the empirical results are inconclusive.
In cross-country studies as well as in studies for the US, Germany and China, econometric
results of a positive or negative impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth can be
found. Aside methodological problems, one reason for the ambiguity of these results may be
seen in the fact that fiscal decentralization is mainly measured in terms of the share of sub-
federal spending from total spending. This measure does not reflect actual fiscal autonomy of
sub-federal jurisdictions because it may largely depend on federal grants, or participate in a– 4 –
system of joint taxation, or are restricted by federal mandates on either the revenue or expen-
diture sides of their budgets. In addition, it would be useful to consider different instruments
of fiscal federalism in order to find out which combination of elements of cooperative and
competitive federalism serve the purpose of a relatively reasonable organization of fiscal fed-
eralism. For example, tax competition can be combined with certain forms of federal grants
mitigating negative allocative or distributional effects.
In this paper, we empirically study the impact of different instruments of fiscal federalism on
economic performance measured by GDP per capita using panel data for the 26 Swiss cantons
from 1980 to 1998. In many policy debates in Germany, Austria and France, proponents and
opponents are interested in the US and Swiss experiences of a system of competitive federal-
ism. While there exists fiscal competition in both countries, in Switzerland the cantons rely to
a larger extent on direct (income and profit) taxes to finance public services than the US
states. This creates an even more intense fiscal competition in Switzerland. In addition, the
Swiss federal level provides grants to the cantons. In our econometric production function
approach, the impact of these different instruments of fiscal federalism, tax competition and
grants, on economic performance are analyzed by additionally using physical and human
capital investment as well as further controls and indicators of fiscal federalism. While
matching grants are negatively correlated with economic performance, the intensity of tax
competition, which is measured by the difference between a canton’s tax rate and the average
of its neighbors’ tax rates is at least not harmful for economic performance. Moreover, the
fragmentation of cantons in communities does not affect real GDP per capita indicating that
economies of scale do not necessarily provide a good argument for a merger of communities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The different transmission channels by
which fiscal federalism affects economic growth are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 surveys
the empirical literature on the impact of fiscal federalism on growth. In Section 4, the Swiss
tax system is explained in order to demonstrate the importance of sub-federal Swiss taxing
powers. Data and the specification of our empirical model appear in Section 5 while Section 6
discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Transmission Channels of Fiscal Federalism on Economic Growth
1
Given the political controversy around the world, the question emerges how the different in-
stitutional arrangements of federalism influence economic development of a country and its– 5 –
regions. What are the transmission channels of fiscal federalism on economic growth? Addi-
tionally, the question arises: what is the influence of federalism on the regional growth proc-
esses. Which contribution to regional development should be ascribed to cooperative fiscal
federalism or fiscal competition?
Most economists judge competition positively: it is a means to achieve variability and quality
of product supply, and it provides goods and services according to individuals’ preferences.
Some economists believe that the same is true for systems competition. Governments can
experiment with new solutions for economic problems in a decentralized fashion. Better solu-
tions succeed in a process of imitation and copycatting by other jurisdictions. Competition
between jurisdictions thus becomes a discovery process, which contributes to the progress in
the public sector. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis already contended in 1932: „It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country“ (quote by Oates 1999, p. 1132). Such a ‘laboratory federalism’ served
as a role model for the reform of welfare in the US in 1996 (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997).
In a similar way Weingast (1995) emphasizes the advantages of a „ market-preserving feder-
alism“. Starting from a „fundamental political dilemma ”, according to which “a government
strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to con-
fiscate the wealth of its citizens” (p. 1), competitive federalism reduces the size of government
interventions and thus helps to maintain market efficiency. Because of the increased opportu-
nities of mobile production factors to migrate, sub-federal jurisdictions conduct policies that
are in the interest of these mobile factors and thus create solutions favoring market efficiency.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the political economy analysis by Brennan and Bu-
chanan (1980). Weingast (1995) does however not provide precise considerations as to the
growth effects of federalism. He only mentions the advantageous development in England in
the 18
th century and in the US in the 19
th century as evidence of market-preserving federalism.
Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) doubt the simplicity of the argument. Instead of serving
the interests of mobile investors, sub-federal jurisdictions may be captured by local interest
groups and introduce protectionist measures in order to shelter them from external competi-
tion. Whether federalism produces market-preserving or protectionist policies, thus depends
on additional institutional safeguards.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1. For a more extensive survey of the theoretical and empirical studies investigating the impact of fiscal feder-
alism on economic growth, see Feld, Zimmermann and Döring (2003, 2003a).– 6 –
The higher innovative capacity of a federal as compared to a unitary system as possible ex-
planations of differences in the economic development of countries is hence contested. In a
decentralized system citizens use services provided by the governments of other jurisdictions
as a yardstick to evaluate the policy of their government in elections (yardstick competition
according to Salmon 1987, Besley and Case 1995, Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy 2002, 2003). A
government is re-elected, if it provides services that are at least not worse than those in other
jurisdictions or the tax prices of which are not higher. Each government hence has incentives
to wait initially in order to imitate only those policies of other jurisdictions that have turned
out to be relatively successful. If the government of a state is uncertain about re-election, it
has an incentive to act as a free-rider with respect to the policy innovations of other jurisdic-
tions finally reducing the absolute amount of policy innovations in a federation (Rose-
Ackerman 1980).
2 Schnellenbach (2004) studies the incentives for policy innovations in a
decentralized setting by particularly focusing on the incentives of voters. As voters normally
have little incentives to be politically informed before elections, policy innovations are mainly
possible in times of crises. Citizens’ incentives to become informed on policy innovations are
however improved by high mobility and elements of direct democracy in political decision-
making processes. Political rents of governments can hence be reduced by competition, and
politicians can be offered incentives to innovate.
Similarly, political scientists and sociologists, who study political and societal innovations in
federal systems for a longer time than economists (Walker 1969, Gray 1973, Berry and Berry
1990, Nice 1994), do not agree whether federalism is favorable to policy innovations. Mayntz
(1995), for instance, emphasizes the creation of knowledge that is induced by parallel experi-
mentation. Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel (1976) and Scharpf (1978, 1988, 1989) however
question this argument generally: In the special variant of German cooperative federalism,
vertical and horizontal coordination is added to the problem of vertical assignment of func-
tions. In his work on the joint-decision trap in the Federal Republic of Germany, Scharpf ar-
gues that the capacity of cooperative federalism to solve problems is chronically suboptimal
such that the capacity to innovate in federalism is considerably reduced (see also Schmidt
2001, p. 477). These results constitute an important argument in the political discussion in
Germany against this variant of German federalism. In fact, some authors, like Blankart and
                                                                
2. According to Strumpf (2002) this free-rider behavior strongly depends on homogeneity and on the number
of jurisdictions. Heterogeneous jurisdictions act to a lesser extent as free-riders, because it pays off to them
to realize first-mover advantages with tailor-made policy innovations. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2001)
point out that in a federal country policy innovations offer selfish politicians the possibility to obtain per-
sonal advantages and to let them appear as the result of the uncertainty of policy innovations.– 7 –
Mueller (2002), hold the second chamber (Bundesrat) partially responsible for the missing
reforms in Germany. If one considers the current German growth weakness, which to a major
degree could be ascribed to the lack of the political system to innovate, then the importance of
political innovations for the national development of a country is obvious. The discussion in
this section however underlines that the relation between federalism and growth is rather
complicated such that it does not suffice to compare federal and unitary states. It seems rea-
sonable to look more closely at the different instruments of federalism and on how public
services are provided and financed.
Another line of research corroborates this view. It is often hypothesized that fiscal federalism
with far-reaching competencies of the subnational levels to decide on revenue and spending
leads to an unfavorable regional distribution of income such that poor regions become poorer
and rich regions become richer (see the discussion in Feld 2002, Feld and Kirchgässner 2003
as well as Thierstein et al. 2003). The more affluent taxpayers sort themselves in regions
where the tax burden is lower. Poor regions, however, supposedly need to levy high taxes to
finance the ‘necessary’ infrastructure for catching up with richer regions. If these jurisdictions
enter fiscal competition, the economic differences between regions are exacerbated. Instead of
having a regional convergence, divergence of regional incomes results. The policy conclusion
from this reasoning is clear: Fiscal competition should be eliminated by harmonization or
centralization and it should be supplemented by grants that equalize regional fiscal capacity.
Cooperative federalism is the policy conclusion.
Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Baldwin and Krugman
(2004), and Brakman, Garretsen and Van Marrewijk (2003) challenge this view from the per-
spective of the New Economic Geography by analyzing the impact of fiscal competition on
the economic development of central and peripheral regions. The advantages of agglomera-
tions in the economic centers permit them to raise higher taxes than the peripheral regions. An
example from the EU may illustrate this. Northern Italy offers firms an excellent infrastruc-
ture, well-established relations with customers and suppliers, and a highly qualified workforce
such that it can afford the relatively high Italian tax burden. Peripheral regions, like Ireland,
have hardly any alternative to balance their locational disadvantages than tax policy and pub-
lic investment in infrastructure. They need to attract economic activity by an appropriate mix
of taxes and public services. Harmonization or centralization of fiscal competencies would
take from peripheral regions the few instruments to compensate for their locational disadvan-
tages vis-à-vis the central regions, and it would therefore be harmful for regional develop-
ment. It is nevertheless questionable whether government policies are sufficiently powerful to– 8 –
compensate for these strong locational advantages of central regions. These theoretical studies
cast doubts as to the success of grants to foster regional development.
Given these arguments, fiscal federalism might influence economic development in several
ways that also depend on the perspective adopted. First, it could be asked whether fiscal com-
petition or fiscal cooperation between sub-federal jurisdictions has an effect on economic
growth of the sub-federal jurisdictions. In that case, fiscal competition theoretically has am-
biguous effects because on the one hand it might induce higher efficiency of public goods’
provision and higher political innovation in that region and hence a better economic perform-
ance of the regions or states. On the other hand, fiscal competition might lead to migration of
mobile production factors to centers of economic activity where agglomeration economies can
be realized such that they are sufficiently affluent to afford excellent infrastructure. Single
poorer regions might suffer from that competition. However, they may equally gain from fis-
cal competition when they can credibly commit to a low tax burden which might compensate
for existing locational disadvantages.
Similarly, grants as the main fiscal instrument of cooperative federalism have ambiguous ef-
fects on economic performance. On the one hand, grants may help poorer regions to provide
more attractive conditions to potential investors than they could otherwise afford. Hence, it is
possible to attract investors or to motivate existing investors not to leave with the help of in-
tergovernmental grants. Fiscal transfers result in an income increase of the recipient regions
possibly leading to a higher GDP per capita. On the other hand, grants provide adverse incen-
tives to the poorer regions hampering structural change for new and promising technologies.
Consequently, the status quo will be preserved and declining industries are artificially kept
alive while  reforms are postponed to the future under possibly worse conditions. Specific
problems emerge for regions with excessive debt levels. Grants designed as bailout payment
provide incentives to stay indebted (soft budget constraint). Second, it is an open question
whether fiscal competition or coordination accelerates or decelerates convergence of regions
of a country. The same reasoning mentioned before with respect to regional economic devel-
opment applies here with the a focus on the catching-up hypothesis.
The third perspective is different since a national perspective is adopted. Fiscal competition or
cooperation could foster economic performance of the whole country by exploiting efficiency
potential in the provision of the public good. Again, there is an ambiguous assessment of the
relation between economic development and fiscal federalism. On the one hand, and quite
simply, fiscal competition might lead to a more efficient allocation of labor and capital in– 9 –
central regions that are the main growth poles of the economy. In addition, the incentives
from fiscal competition to innovate and provide public services more efficiently reduces the
waste of resources in the economy as a whole. From that perspective, grants mainly provide
negative incentives to successful regions in exploiting their economic potential because trans-
fers in a horizontal fiscal equalization system has the effect of a tax on the additional revenue
that could accrue by the location of new taxpayers. On the other hand, fiscal competition may
deprive the poorer regions’ structural change stimulating higher overall growth rates when
completed. In this case, the positive impact of grants to induce structural change in recipient
regions needs to compensate for the negative incentives for donor regions in order to have an
overall positive impact on economic development of a country.
3. A Survey on the Empirical Evidence
Since the theoretical results on the impact of fiscal federalism on economic development are
ambiguous, empirical studies might shed some light on the issue. The empirical studies test-
ing this hypothesis do however not provide consistent results. This holds for cross-country
studies as well as for studies on single countries. In the area of cross country studies, Davoodi
and Zou (1998) find a weakly significant negative relation between the degree of fiscal feder-
alism and the average growth rate of GDP per capita for a sample of 46 countries over the
period from 1970 to 1989. For the sub-sample of industrial countries this effect is not signifi-
cant. The negative influence for developing countries, anyhow, is robust though only weakly
significant as well. According to these estimates, an additional decentralization of spending
by 10 percent reduces the growth of real GDP per capita in developing countries by 0.7 – 0.8
percentage points. Woller and Philipps (1998) also cannot find a robust relation between eco-
nomic growth and decentralization, using a sample with a lower number of developing coun-
tries and a shorter time period.
In a recent analysis for average economic growth of the past 25 years in a cross-section of 91
countries, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) show that the effects of fiscal decentralization
depend to a large extent on the structure of the party system as well as on the degree of ‘sub-
ordination’ of subnational levels. According to them, especially in developing and transition
countries, the age of the most important political parties is favorable to the positive effects of
decentralization on economic growth. In countries with a – in this respect weaker – party
system, a 10 percent increase of decentralization of revenue decreases real per capita GDP
growth by 0.14 percentage-points. These results are in contrast to those of Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab (2002) according to whom the decentralization of revenue significantly reduces– 10 –
the growth of real GDP per capita of developed countries, but not of the developing and tran-
sition countries. Yilmaz (2000) analyzes the different effects of fiscal decentralization in 17
unitary and 13 federal countries for the period 1971-1990 with annual data. Decentralization
of expenditures to the local level increases the growth of real GDP per capita in unitary states
more strongly than in federal states. However, the decentralization to the intermediate level in
federations is not significant. Thießen (2003) analyzes the average growth rates of real GDP
per capita for a cross-section of 21 developed countries in the period 1973-1998 and in a par-
allel study (Thießen 2003a) for a panel of 26 countries between1981 and 1995. According to
his estimates a 10 percent increase of decentralization of expenditures increases the growth of
real GDP per capita by 0.12-0.15 percentage points in high-income countries. However, the
relation between federalism and economic growth might be non-linear, because the quadratic
term of expenditure decentralization is significantly negative.
The empirical results concerning the impact of decentralization on economic growth for indi-
vidual countries also appear to be ambiguous. To date the discussion is limited to China, the
US, and Germany. Zhang and Zou (1998) note a significantly negative effect of expenditure
decentralization on economic growth in 28 Chinese provinces, using annual data between
1987 and 1993. Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999), however, report a weekly significant positive
effect of expenditure decentralization on economic growth of almost the same sample of Chi-
nese provinces over time. The most important difference between the studies is the use of
time dummies that are not included by Zhang and Zou (1998). Consequently, symmetric
shocks are not adequately controlled for. Lin and Liu (2000) strengthen the result of a positive
relation between decentralization and economic growth in Chinese provinces for the period
1970 to 1993 also for the revenue side. In addition, higher responsibility of public budgets at
the provincial level is connected with increased economic growth. These authors also use time
dummies in addition to fixed cross-section effects. The relevance for the estimates of using
time dummies points to the strong economic dynamics in China. The sometimes enormously
high Chinese growth rates apparently cannot be captured by structural variables alone so that
auxiliary variables for the individual years are necessary for correctly specifying the
econometric model. Thus, for China, there might well exist a positive relation between de-
centralization of governmental activity and economic growth.
In a time-series analysis for the US from 1951 to 1992, Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) claim
that the US is in a decentralization equilibrium. They ascribe this to the fact that differences in
decentralization at the state or local level do not exert statistically significant effects on real
GDP growth. Akai and Sakata (2002), however, offer evidence to the contrary for US states.– 11 –
Considering additional explanatory factors and various indicators for the degree of fiscal fed-
eralism, they find a positive influence on economic growth. If expenditure decentralization
increases by 10 percent, the growth of GDP per capita increases by 1.6 to 3.2 percentage
points. However, decentralization on the revenue side and indicators for fiscal autonomy of
subnational levels, measured by the share of own revenue in total revenue, do not show sig-
nificant effects. Both studies might not necessarily contradict each other because of the differ-
ent perspectives adopted. While the first study starts from a national perspective, the second
one adopts the perspective of the single states. As mentioned in Section 2, both perspectives
might well coincide with each other.
The same argument might hold for Germany. Berthold, Drews and Thode (2001) analyze the
effects of horizontal fiscal equalization between states and supplementary federal grants on
economic development of the 16 Lander in a panel analysis with annual data from 1991 to
1998. According to their estimates, higher grants in horizontal and vertical fiscal relations
significantly reduce the growth of nominal GDP per capita of the Lander. Behnisch, Büttner
and Stegarescu (2002), however, find a positive effect of increasing federal activities – meas-
ured by the share of expenditure at the federal level – on total German productivity growth in
a time series analysis from 1950 to 1990. Further empirical evidence does not exist.  Hence,  a
study of the impact of Swiss federalism on economic growth seems to be promising.
4. The Swiss Tax System
Switzerland consists of three governmental layers. The central government, 26 cantons on the
state level and some 3000 municipalities on the local level. The Swiss constitution allows for
comparably high fiscal competencies on the sub-federal level. In contrast to many other (fed-
eralist) countries this holds especially for the taxing powers. All three tiers of government
have their own tax sovereignty. Cantons are free to choose their taxes autonomously, except
they are constitutionally reserved for the central government. The federal constitution explic-
itly lists all revenue sources of the central government in Article 42. The central government
cannot levy new taxes or attract tax power from the cantons without changing the constitution
which, in Switzerland, has to pass a mandatory popular referendum with a simple majority of
the people as well as of the cantons. Additionally, the federal power to tax for income under-
lies a sunset legislation and has to be approved by voters every few years.– 12 –















Zug 49.6 216 26.1
Basel-City 118.9 173 10.8
Zurich 82.5 160 15.1
Geneva 90.2 141 9.7
Nidwalden 75.5 129 39.6
Basel-Land 89.6 120 15.0
Cantons with average financial
potential
Schwyz 65.5 112 40.4
Schaffhausen 114.5 107 17.7
Aargau 86.5 97 19.3
Vaud 111.7 94 19.1
Thurgau 110.7 83 25.7
Solothurn 114 82 26.8
Glarus 105.9 82 26.8
Ticino 80.9 82 23.3
St. Gallen 101.8 80 24.9
Graubünden 95.1 77 47.1
Luzern 123.7 67 27.9
Uri 116.2 64 48.8
Appenzell a.Rh. 108.6 63 29.6
Appenzell i.Rh. 87.9 62 38.7
Financially weak cantons
Bern 115.7 57 28.2
Neuchâtel 125.5 55 38.8
Fribourg 130 51 35.3
Obwalden 126.7 35 44.5
Jura 134.9 34 48.6
Valais 125.1 30 41.7
Switzerland 100 100 23.1
Source: Swiss Federal Tax Administration, 2001, Swiss Federal Finance Administration, 1999
Historically the main taxing powers are assigned to the cantons. Even the tax harmonization
law introduced in 1993 (Article 129 of the Federal Constitution) does not affect the cantonal
competence with respect to tax surcharges, tax rates and tax exemptions. Cantons have the
main taxing powers for individual and corporate income and property whereas the local gov-– 13 –
ernments levy a surcharge on the cantonal income and property taxes. The fiscal autonomy of
municipalities varies considerably from canton to canton, but even in rather centralized can-
tons communes are not forced to keep tax rates on a certain level. Therefore, tax burdens
across Swiss municipalities vary even more than across cantons.
Table 2: Structure of revenue and expenditure in the Swiss federalism, 1950 - 1999
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
% % % % % %
Central government
Revenue 42 40 34 30 31 31
Expenditure 38 35 32 31 31 32
Cantons
Revenue 32 33 39 39 39 40
Expenditure 34 38 40 39 40 40
Municipalities
Revenue 26 27 27 31 30 29
Expenditure 28 27 28 30 29 28
Total*
Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100
Expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Without double counting, Source: Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland, 2000, Table 18.1
Table 1 exhibits the variation of income and property taxes between the cantons for the year
2001. The index of the weighted average for Switzerland is 100, whereas the canton  Jura
reaches the maximum value of 134.3 and the canton Zug the minimum value of 49.5. For in-
stance, a single person who earns a gross income of 100,000 CHF is charged for 19,640 CHF
income taxes on the cantonal and local level in the town of La Chaux-de-Fonds of the canton
Neuchâtel. The same person living in the village of Freienbach of the canton Schwyz has to
pay 4,790 CHF income taxes at the cantonal and local level only (church taxes included). The
federal government relies on indirect taxes like the VAT and the mineral oil tax, but also
raises a tax on income of individuals and corporations in addition to the cantons. Presently,
the federal income tax covers about 60% of total federal revenue. The tax rates for the income
tax on the central level are explicitly enumerated in the constitution. Currently, the statutory
maximum average rate amounts to 11.5% with a maximum marginal rate of 13.2%.
As can be seen from Table 2, the distribution of revenue and expenditure among the three
layers of government changed considerably over time. Contrary to the increase in many other
countries, the share of the central government in total government expenditure and revenue
even decreased by about 10 percentage points within the last fifty years. Today, the financial– 14 –
importance of the sub-federal governments accounts for nearly 70% of all financial flows of
the total government. All in all, with considerable tax autonomy, including progressive i n-
come and property (wealth) taxes, the Swiss sub-federal governments constitute a unique data
base to investigate the effect of federalism on the size of government on the European conti-
nent. Though many other federalist countries in Europe have the power to spend they have
rather limited power to tax which in principle implies that analyzing the effect of fiscal feder-
alism on the size of government is biased in these countries, at best.
5. Data and Empirical Specification
In this paper, we adopt the regional perspective by analyzing economic performance of the
Swiss cantons. Convergence of per capita income of the cantons as well as the impact of
Swiss fiscal federalism on overall economic development of Switzerland are left to future
research. In order to test the impact of federalism on cantonal economic development, we
propose an econometric model that is based on the production function approach employed in
Feld and Savioz (1997). This paper is an application of the empirical analysis of neoclassical
growth models by Maniw, Romer and Weil (1992). As a first shot this is justified instead of
estimating an endogenous growth model because too little is still known on the interaction of
fiscal federalism and agglomeration economies that shape regional development. In this
model, the gross domestic product Qit of each of the 26 cantons at time t is assumed to be a
function of their endowment with labor Lit, human capital H it and plant and equipment (P&E)
Kit. The differentiation in two types of capital goods is appropriate because cantonal authori-
ties and not the federal government are responsible for education in Switzerland. The follow-
ing specification of the Cobb Douglas production function is used:
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The technological disturbance term eit is assumed to be independently and normally distrib-
uted.. bj, j=1, 2, 3, are the elasticities of output with respect to the factors of production. In-
stitutions of fiscal federalism, D, hence enter the production function as a technological factor
and reflect the efficiency of public activities. Taking natural logs of both sides of the equation
yields the following econometric model:
lnQit = b0 Dit+ b1 lnLit + b2 lnHit + b3lnKit + b4 lnVit + eit (2)– 15 –
where Qit stands for real GDP. The model implies that real GDP is a function of labor (Lit),
human capital (Hit), physical capital (Kit), and a vector of control variables Vit. b0 to b4 are the
parameters of interest while eit denotes the error term. Labor is measured by number of the
cantonal employees, human capital is proxied by cantonal education spending per capita.
Since there are no data on cantonal capital stocks we use cantonal capital investment instead.
Population size of the cantons is included as the most important control variable.
The focus of the analysis is on the impact of federalism on economic performance, which is
tested by five different variables: revenue or spending decentralization, grants, tax competi-
tion, fragmentation, and urbanization. Decentralization as the local fiscal autonomy is proxied
by the ratio of local revenue (spending) on the aggregated state and local revenue (spending).
The decentralization measures are used to conduct a similar test as is done in the empirical
studies mentioned above. Following the traditional Tiebout approach, decentralization is hy-
pothesized to have a positive effect on economic performance. Decentralization as such does
however not suffice because it does not really indicate whether and to what extent sub-
ordinate jurisdictions, in this case communities, are autonomously deciding on finances. In-
stead of simply taking this one variable as indicating more or less federalism in the Swiss
cantons we additionally focus on the different instruments of fiscal federalism in Switzerland.
Hence, matching grants per capita as the most important instrument of cooperative federalism
in Switzerland are included. The predicted sign of this variable is ambiguous since it might
either lead to a waste of resources or help poor cantons to catch up with the richer ones. In a
second step, we additionally include federal lump-sum grants in order to find out whether
there are notable differences between both instruments. Tax competition is measured by the
difference between a canton’s tax rate in the highest income tax bracket of a million Swiss
francs annual taxable income and the average of its neighboring cantons’ tax burden in that
bracket (see Feld and Reulier, 2002). This variable indicates that the higher the difference to
average tax burden of the neighboring cantons, the higher the pressure of tax competition on
the cantonal and local tax authorities. The tax competition variable is a proxy for the extent of
competitive federalism in Switzerland. The fragmentation variable is constructed by the num-
ber of communes in a canton divided by population. It is supposed to capture the lack of ex-
ploiting economies of scale. In political, but also scientific discussions about reforms of fiscal
federalism, it is often argued that the number of jurisdictions should be reduced by mergers in
order to exploit economies of scale. If there are economies of scale, the lack of their exploita-
tion, i.e. a higher number of communities, should have a negative impact on economic per-
formance. Urbanization, measured by the share of people living in urban areas, is included to– 16 –
capture the argument from new economic geography that economic centers are more strongly
developing than the periphery. Finally, a dummy for the canton of Basle and a language
dummy are included as standard controls (the results of both are not reported).
The analysis uses yearly data from 1980 to 1998 deflated to the year 1980. The subscript i =
1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t = 1980, ..., 1998 indexes years. The empirical analysis is per-
formed using a pooled cross-section time-series model. The consistency of OLS-estimates
depends on the exogeneity of the regressands. In order to tackle the problem of possible en-
dogeneity of the grants variable, we use an instrumental variable technique with cantonal
dummy variables as instruments. Finally, year effects to circumvent time dependency are in-
cluded and the standard errors are corrected by the Newey-West method.
6. Results
The test strategy is, first, estimating the model without any instruments of fiscal federalism by
OLS. In a second step, we include the decentralization variables in turn and add the remaining
variables of fiscal federalism like grants, tax competition and so on in a third step. The OLS
results in column (1) of Table 3 indicate that the basic equation performs relatively well. As
usual in the estimation of production functions of this type, investment, human capital and
labor are highly significant and have the expected positive signs. Population is significant at
the 5 percent level. The language dummy does not have any significant effect, while the time
dummies are highly significant. The estimated coefficients of the production factors add to 0.8
which is significantly different from zero. Constant returns to scale are thus not fully
achieved, but the sum of estimated elasticities falls only slightly short of it.
Adding the decentralization of spending to the model in  column (2) does not change much.
The decentralization has the expected positive sign, but is far from any significance level. The
same holds with respect to the decentralization of revenue in column (3). However, as column
(4) indicates, matching grants have a negative impact on economic performance and are sig-
nificant on the 1 percent level. This may point to the negative incentive effects of the Swiss
fiscal equalization system (Schaltegger and Frey, 2003). It might however as well be the re-
sult of a reversed causality such that the cantons with a higher GDP get less matching grants.
Moreover, the tax competition variable has a positive impact on GDP per capita and is sig-
nificant on the 5 percent level. The higher the neighbors’ tax rates, the smaller is the differ-
ence between the canton’s tax rate and that of its neighbors. The lower is however also a
canton’s GDP per capita showing that tax competition is not harmful to economic perform-
ance of the Swiss cantons, but that it might indeed force them to efficiently allocate public– 17 –
resources. Moreover, fragmentation of a canton in a higher number of small communities only
has a marginally significant impact on economic performance. This result is dampening the
hope for strong efficiency gains from community mergers that are declared policy in a few
cantons. Finally, urbanity does not have any significant impact on economic performance.
Table 3: Regressions of real cantonal GDP on fiscal federalism indicators and controls,
26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
































































Lumpsum grants – – – – – 0.018
(0.77)



























2 0.787 0.787 0.788 0.840 0.836 0.833
SER 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.042 0.042 0.043
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
Jarque-Bera 14.111*** 12.706*** 12.253*** 7.853** 5.562* 9.270***
Note: t-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not
reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The Jarque-Bera test
statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.
The results reported in the first four columns of Table 3 suffer from a particular endogeneity
problem. The negative impact of the matching grant variable might simply reflect reverse
causality because poorer cantons are supposed to receive higher grants per capita according to
the main economic and political arguments but also according to the legal provisions of the
Swiss grants system. In order to cope with this endogeneity problem, equation (4) from Table
3 is estimated by TSLS instead of OLS. As instruments, the cross section (cantonal) fixed– 18 –
effects are used. These results are presented column (5) of Table 3. Employing an instrumen-
tal variable technique does not alter the results. Both, population and labor force, become sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level only. The fiscal federalism variables are however almost not
affected. Fragmentation is now insignificant which more clearly indicates that mergers of
communities do not appear to generate considerable economic gains. The estimated impact of
matching grants on economic performance increases in absolute value. Including lump-sum
grants in addition to matching grants in column (6) of Table 3 does also not affect the results
considerably. Lump-sum grants do not have any significant impact on GDP of the cantons.
This is no surprise because those lump-sum grants are much more a revenue sharing arrange-
ment that only partially reflects equalization goals.
Overall the estimated models perform relatively well. Between 79 and 84 percent of the
variation of real cantonal GDP can be explained. The Jarque-Bera test statistics indicate how-
ever that the hypothesis of normality of the residuals can be rejected at least on the 10 percent
level in all estimated equations. Broadly speaking, controlling for outliers does not affect the
estimation results. In column (1), (2) and  (3), dummy variables for the cantons of Zurich,
Vaud, Jura, Zug, and Schwyz need to be included in order to obtain normality of the residuals
(J.-B. (1) = 4.547, J.-B. (2) = 3.784, J.-B. (3) = 3.872) without any notable change in the esti-
mated coefficients. Similar outcomes are obtained for the fourth model and the TSLS estima-
tions by excluding the respective outliers. The results are hence not only robust to the estima-
tion method, but also to the inclusion of outliers.
7. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to test the effect of federalism on economic performance. Starting
from the literature on fiscal federalism and economic growth we have analyzed the impact of
different instruments of Swiss federalism on real GDP per capita. The results indicate that
matching grants have a negative impact on economic performance while tax competition is at
least not harmful to economic performance. Tax competition appears to induce cantons to
allocate public funds relatively more efficiently such that economic performance of a canton
is improved. Fragmentation of a canton in many communities does not robustly affect GDP
per capita. All in all, the instruments of competitive federalism in Switzerland are more suc-
cessful in shaping economic development than those of cooperative federalism.
In addition to the results reported in this paper, additional robustness checks have been per-
formed. The results remain robust to the inclusion of alternative instruments and to additional
explanatory variables. In particular, political economy variables like coalition size or ideology– 19 –
do not affect the impact of different indicators of fiscal federalism. However, additional ro-
bustness analyses remain to be done. For example, the impact of transmission channels of
fiscal federalism, in particular of tax competition, on innovation of firms in the different can-
tons needs to be analyzed to obtain more insights in the working of fiscal federalism. Finally,
the two other perspectives on fiscal federalism and economic performance, the convergence
and national growth perspectives need to be addressed in order to obtain a full picture.
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